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Introduction
The autonomy and capacity of a state to make and 
implement public policy (or to exercise its ‘stewardship’ 
functions) (WHO, 2000, p.122) is a fundamental 
characteristic of statehood. ‘Autonomy’ for a state is defined 
as ‘the ability of government institutions to resist being 
captured by interest groups and to act fairly as an arbiter 
of social conflicts’ (ibid.). ‘Capacity’ refers to the ability of 
government systems to make and implement policy and 
‘springs from the expertise, resources and coherence of the 
machinery of government’ (Buse, Mays and Walt, 2007, p.81). 
Understanding the nature of autonomy and capacity in a 
particular state and how well that state is able to maintain or 
extend its autonomy or capacity to develop effective public 
policies is important because this enables states to strengthen 
these characteristics over time. 
This article reports on the findings of 
comparative research conducted in 
England and New Zealand to explore 
relative levels of autonomy and capacity 
for primary health care policymaking 
in the two countries between 2001 and 
2007. England and New Zealand both 
introduced pay-for-performance schemes 
in their primary health care systems, 
with incentives for general practitioners 
to achieve improved population-based 
health outcomes. The purpose in both 
countries was to increase state influence 
over the quality and allocation of publicly 
funded primary health care delivered by 
the medical profession. Policy change 
was needed to increase preventive and 
population-based practice among general 
practitioners, and resolve increasingly 
visible problems of variation in the 
quality of, and access to, primary health 
care which were leading to substantial 
disparities in health outcomes for some 
citizens. The highly individualised and 
treatment-centred practice norms of the 
general practice profession meant that 
general practitioners, especially in New 
Zealand, ‘had their strongest focus on 
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patients who walked in the door ... [and] 
did not understand “disparity” in access 
to health services very well, feeling little 
responsibility for a population-based 
approach to health’ (O’Malley, 2003). 
The pay-for-performance scheme in New 
Zealand was aimed at changing this model 
of practice.
Subsequent research (Smith, 2015) 
investigated how the ‘stewardship’ 
functions of each state were exercised in 
these pay-for-performance policymaking 
episodes, and the results are reported 
here. The research also identified how 
the different contexts within the health 
system in each country affected the state’s 
policymaking autonomy and capacity, 
and which of the two countries was most 
successful in achieving the outcomes 
sought. This article also updates progress 
on the outcomes sought by policymakers, 
reporting research published in 2014 
which rated the New Zealand health system 
poorly on variables of safe care, access 
and equity in comparison with England 
(Davis et al., 2014). This indicates that 
the steps taken between 2001 and 2007, 
although laying important foundations 
for achieving better outcomes, and 
for subsequent policymaking in New 
Zealand, have been considerably less 
successful than those taken in England. 
In 2016 the New Zealand Ministry of 
Health published a new health strategy 
which acknowledged that New Zealand’s 
health system continues to face significant 
challenges in terms of access, equity and 
affordability (Minister of Health, 2016).  
 It is hoped that the findings 
reported here will assist New Zealand 
policymakers to monitor and develop 
their health policymaking autonomy or 
capacity, based on evidence about their 
current performance, and will enable 
policymakers to consider whether and 
how to change elements of this context to 
facilitate more effective policymaking in 
future. Recommendations for a process 
of stewardship-building within New 
Zealand’s primary health care system are 
made. 
Contextual structural and historical 
considerations for the two case studies
Both countries are Western majoritarian 
unitary democracies with strongly 
adversarial political systems and high 
levels of autonomy and authority for 
central government (Richards and Smith, 
2002; Shaw and Eichbaum, 2008; Pollitt et 
al., 2010). They followed similar patterns 
of national health system establishment 
in the 1930s and 40s (Lovell-Smith, 1966; 
Hanson, 1980; Bolitho, 1984; Hay, 1989; 
Ham, 1992; Fougere, 1993; Tuohy, 1999; 
Klein, 2006). However, in New Zealand 
politicians failed to secure a single-payer 
arrangement for general practice services. 
The dispute over payment arrangements 
left a legacy of division and mistrust 
between general practice organisations 
and politicians. Later attempts at 
reform were vehemently resisted by the 
profession (Hay, 1989). However, both 
England and New Zealand undertook 
similar New Public Management-inspired 
reforms to introduce competitive and 
market-oriented approaches into their 
health systems in the 1990s, driven by 
concerns about escalating medical costs 
(Davis and Ashton, 2000; Pollitt and 
Bouckaert, 2011). In the literature on 
health system typologies, they are both 
assessed as being national health systems 
with comprehensive, universally available 
health services, largely publicly financed 
through taxation (Scott, 2001; Burau 
and Blank, 2006). Despite significant 
differences of ownership and financing 
within the general practice subsystem 
of each country, these shared features of 
their overarching health systems make 
them suitable for a most similar systems 
comparative case study method (Yin, 
2009). 
Policies to increase funder influence 
over general practice activities represented 
a challenge to the set of institutions which 
permit professional self-regulation and 
professional autonomy within medicine. 
They encroached upon doctors’ highly 
valued professional independence 
(Immergut, 1990; Freidson, 2001; Burau 
and Vranbaek, 2008). Medical institutions 
‘organize and advance the discipline 
by controlling training, certification 
and practice on the one hand and by 
supporting and organising the creation 
and refinements of knowledge and 
skill on the other’ (Freidson, 2001). 
Pay-for-performance is part of a set 
of ‘managerial notions that efficiency 
is gained from minimizing discretion’ 
(ibid., p.3) and was seen by some general 
practitioners as the standardisation and 
commodification of care based on targets 
set not by the profession but by the 
funder, and therefore inimical to these 
norms. However, others were more open 
to pay-for-performance approaches, 
and it was not a new idea in 2001. A 
small, voluntary pay-for-performance 
scheme within general practice was 
introduced in 1990 in England as part 
of an imposed contract with general 
practitioners (Klein, 2006). In New 
Zealand, a variety of pay-for-performance 
initiatives had been adopted by doctors’ 
organisations themselves to assist them 
to fulfil contracts for improved use of 
pharmaceutical prescribing and referrals 
to other services. With the election of a 
new Labour government in New Zealand 
in 1999 and the re-election of the Labour 
government in 2001 in England, in 
both countries politicians decided, in a 
‘logic of escalation’ (Pollitt et al., 2008), 
that those small pay-for-performance 
measures which had taken root in the 
1990s would be scaled up for national 
implementation, and substantial sums of 
additional money provided for meeting 
clinical and organisational quality targets 
within general practice. 
Both countries are Western majoritarian 
unitary democracies with strongly 
adversarial political systems and high 
levels of autonomy and authority for 
central government ...
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Methods
A comparative case study methodology 
in a most similar systems design (Yin, 
2009) was used, based on purposeful 
selection of the two case studies. The 
drivers of non-incremental policy 
change, including institutions, networks, 
ideas and socio-economic circumstances 
(John, 1998), were identified in each 
policymaking episode and comparatively. 
The two case studies showed outputs 
which differed in size, scope and speed of 
implementation and achieved differing 
levels of impact upon health outcomes. 
The primary research question 
considered is: in what respects and 
why did two similar episodes of policy 
formulation and implementation in two 
similar jurisdictions follow different 
processes and have different outcomes? 
A qualitative methodology, including 
documentary analysis and semi-
structured interviews with 26 decision 
makers, leaders of and participants in 
the policymaking process, was used. The 
data was thematically analysed (Braun 
and Clarke, 2006), using an inductive 
approach, and written up as two case 
study narratives. These cases were 
then compared, including contextual, 
structural and historical considerations, 
to develop a set of similarities and 
differences. The process sought to 
‘locate some particular feature in which 
otherwise very similar nations differ [so 
that] we are entitled to suggest that it is 
attributable to one of the few other factors 
distinguishing them’ (Castles, 1991). 
For this process, the dependent variable 
was the policy outcome and all other 
variables, including institutional and 
structural features, network and group 
structure, rational choice explanations, 
ideas and socio-economic factors, were 
explored as independent variables. 
The two case studies
England: the design of the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework
In England in 2000, the pay-for-
performance programme was part of a new 
National Health Service plan (Secretary 
of State for Health, 2000) ‘to introduce 
systems where the money spent was linked 
to performance and where the service 
user was in the driver’s seat’ (Blair, 2010). 
There was also a strong commitment 
to use the reforms to reduce health 
inequalities (Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 2010) by increasing the quality 
of care and introducing more preventive 
practices into primary care services. Both 
goals were in Labour Party manifestos and 
ministerial speeches during the election 
campaign in 2001. During that campaign, 
general practitioners, who were entirely 
dependent on state funding for their 
income, threatened to strike unless a new, 
improved contract was offered to them. 
Once the Labour Party was elected 
the manifesto promises were immediately 
implemented. The health policy adviser to 
the prime minister described the reform 
process as ‘constructive discomfort’. It 
would put some pressure on professional 
autonomy within the medical profession 
through a top-down imposition of 
standards and targets and by subjecting 
the profession to competition from 
other suppliers of medical services. In 
this reform programme, more money 
for general practitioners was conditional 
upon better performance: ‘GPs’ new 
contracts will allow them to earn around 
a third more, linked to markers of quality’ 
(Stevens, 2004). The British Medical 
Association (BMA) represented all 
English GPs and was the sole bargaining 
agent on their behalf. BMA negotiators 
readily agreed that a pay-for-performance 
mechanism could form a major part of 
a new contract. However, they had little 
choice; it was hard for them to resist 
the strong expectations of the secretary 
of state for health that new money for 
general practitioners would be subject to 
pay-for-performance. A participant in the 
negotiations saw the secretary of state for 
health as insistent that ‘there would be no 
pay rise for work already being done’. He 
had a ‘bloody-minded determination for 
performance pay’.
Both parties then sought a large 
scheme. On the government side, it was 
believed that the success of early pay-for-
performance schemes (Spooner, Chapple 
and Roland, 2000, 2001) had demonstrated 
the effectiveness of rewarding doctors for 
preventive practice, justifying a scheme 
with as many indicators as possible. For 
the BMA, the larger the scheme, the more 
money was available to its members. In 
addition, the pre-eminent role of the 
BMA in its relationship with government 
was at stake. The BMA feared, it was said, 
that if it could not broker a popular and 
lucrative national deal for its members, 
other forms of localised contracting 
would erode its sole bargaining rights for 
all GPs. 
Medical professionals dominated the 
membership of the team which designed 
the pay-for-performance component 
of the new contract, the Quality and 
Outcomes Framework (QOF), constituting 
seven of 11 members. An academic team 
was recruited as interlocutors to consider 
evidence for suitable clinical targets for 
the scheme. Members of the different 
teams involved had known one another 
for a number of years in some cases. 
Almost all were practising GPs for at least 
a small part of their working week, even 
when the rest of the week was spent as 
a medico-politician or academic. A large 
scheme, which included 146 targets and 
determined the level of over 30% of the 
new income of GPs, was jointly designed 
and negotiated by the government and 
BMA teams.
The QOF could not be implemented 
without the design of a major new 
software application. A participant 
describes how, having designed an 
indicator, ‘then we had to go on and work 
out how you would verify it’ by extracting 
performance data from every general 
A large scheme, which included 146 
targets and determined the level of over 
30% of the new income of GPs, was 
jointly designed and negotiated by the 
government and BMA teams.
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practice. This presented significant 
practical problems. There were many 
different suppliers of computer systems 
for general practice; some practices 
were not yet computerised; and there 
were concerns about confidentiality of 
patient information. Yet this project 
was achieved in 26 weeks. A ‘high trust’ 
system for monitoring and reporting 
achievements against targets was 
introduced, along with a provision for 
independent audit, enabling general 
practices to monitor their progress and 
be funded for their achievements against 
the QOF. The scheme was implemented 
remarkably quickly by 99% of general 
practitioners. Within a year of its 
launch, performance against the targets 
was higher than expected and payments 
to general practices under the QOF 
exceeded budget allocations.
Evaluations of the success of this large 
pay-for-performance scheme have been 
mixed and widely reported (Comptroller 
and Auditor General, 2008; Doran and 
Roland, 2010). Several studies reported 
positive results, including a surge in 
morale and recruitment within the 
general practice profession, an initial 
acceleration in quality of treatment for a 
small number of chronic conditions, and 
reductions in variation in quality of care 
related to deprivation (Doran and Roland, 
2010; McDonald et al., 2010; Roland and 
Campbell, 2014). A key study found 
that there were statistically significant 
associations between higher levels of 
achievement on QOF clinical indicators 
for coronary heart disease, hypertension, 
congestive heart failure, diabetes and 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease 
and reductions in rates of ambulatory-
sensitive hospital admissions for those 
conditions (Dixon et al., 2010). 
New Zealand: the design of the Performance 
Programme
The New Zealand Labour Party manifesto 
of 1999 also promised a new focus 
on improving the quality of primary 
health care and increasing population-
based and preventive health care, seeing 
general practice services as ‘too focused 
on treatment services at the expense of 
improving the health of the community’ 
(New Zealand Labour Party, 1999). The 
focus on population-based and preventive 
health care grew out of concerns about 
disparities in health outcomes within New 
Zealand. Research had shown that there 
were ‘significant and enduring health 
disparities relating to both ethnicity and 
deprivation’. These included a nine-year 
gap in life expectancy between Mäori and 
non-Mäori New Zealanders, and between 
males living in the most deprived and least 
deprived geographical areas (Crampton, 
2000). Once elected, Labour replaced 
state funding on a fee-for-service basis 
with capitation-based funding of primary 
care services (King, 2001). A new network 
of primary health organisations (PHOs) 
was formed to manage primary health 
care services, including general practice 
services, and people were required to enrol 
on a PHO register for health care. Targets 
were set for PHO delivery of preventive as 
well as curative services. 
Unlike England’s single-payer and 
single-ownership model for general 
practice, New Zealand had many types 
of general practice service delivery 
approaches and ownership forms. There 
were multiple payers for general practice 
services, creating a wide variety of interest 
groupings within the heterogeneous 
primary health care sector. No single 
organisation existed to represent all 
general practitioners in their dealings with 
state funders. Most GPs were members 
of for-profit independent practitioners’ 
associations (IPAs) (Malcolm and Mays, 
1999). ‘Almost all’ of the IPAs held 
contracts with the state to manage and 
improve the quality of prescribing and 
referral services. For IPAs the reforms 
meant the end of these lucrative contracts, 
which had funded quality improvement 
activities among their members for 
many years (Crampton et al., 2004). 
Three per cent of GPs worked in  not-
for-profit community-governed health 
centres, which had been established to 
improve access and equity of outcomes 
for poorer communities. The changes 
to primary health care governance were 
implemented by the Labour government 
despite misgivings in large parts of the 
primary health care sector. As part of 
this process, officials recommended the 
implementation of a national pay-for-
performance scheme to improve the 
quality and equity of pharmaceutical 
prescribing and referrals to services 
within a population-based funding 
framework, now that budget management 
contracts with IPAs for this purpose had 
been cancelled. As in England, the idea 
drew upon successful local initiatives to 
incentivise performance which had been 
developed in the primary health care 
sector in previous years.
A working group of primary health 
care stakeholders was convened to design 
the new Performance Programme (PP) 
for primary health care. Although one 
of the joint chairs of the group was a 
general practitioner, GPs were invited 
to be members of the working group 
as individuals with no representative 
mandate for their profession. These GP 
members also held differing views about 
the role of general practice, reflective of 
the professional divisions in the country 
at large: some were for and some were 
against a state-led pay-for-performance 
scheme. The group utilised a variety of 
consultative methods and the assistance 
of academics to select a small set of 13 
indicators for the PP. The choice of 
indicators was based pragmatically on 
data elements already available from 
central sources, even though they did 
not relate to many of the major health 
Unlike England’s single-payer and 
single-ownership model for general 
practice, New Zealand had many types 
of general practice service delivery 
approaches and ownership forms.
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outcomes the Ministry of Health was 
most interested in improving. This 
was because, unlike in England, efforts 
to gain access to data within practice 
management systems were opposed by 
most New Zealand GPs.  
The set of indicators and the funding 
framework were approved in July 2005. 
Twenty-nine PHOs participated in the 
first phase of the roll-out (a number 
higher than expected), rising to 42 the 
following year. Payments for performance 
were made to PHOs, which distributed 
all or some of these to practices. The 
number of participants rose to 81 of 
the then 82 PHOs in 2007. Achievement 
levels against the indicators averaged 81% 
in 2009 and the budgeted funding for the 
PP was never fully utilised. 
Evaluations found that GPs had 
mixed views about the effectiveness of 
the Performance Programme, that it had 
low visibility among clinicians and that it 
had a low-profile effect on clinical quality 
(MartinJenkins, 2008). GPs appointed 
to the governance group for the PP later 
regretted the missed opportunity. When 
informed that
there was a line item for $35 million 
but [officials] didn’t expect to spend 
it because people wouldn’t achieve 
the targets ... [i]n the room GPs 
suddenly had a quick discussion 
and said so if we lowered the targets 
we could get all the money and the 
ministry people nearly fell off their 
chairs. It was a good example of the 
thinking of different groups.
A later evaluation did, however, find 
that there was a statistically significant 
relationship between achievements under 
the PP for one of the 13 indicators – 
immunisation of under-two-years-olds 
– and vaccine-preventable ambulatory 
sensitive hospital admissions (Cranleigh 
Health, 2012). 
Findings
To recap, the comparative analysis of the 
case study evidence set as the dependent 
variable the policy output and outcomes: 
namely, the size, scope and speed of 
uptake of the policy and the health impact 
achieved by the policy in each country. 
Independent variables investigated were 
institutional factors, group/network 
factors, ideas, socio-economic drivers and 
rational actor drivers of policy change. 
The findings showed that politicians 
in both these Westminster systems 
successfully planned and implemented 
non-incremental change in their primary 
health care systems. However, there were 
certain institutional features which differed 
between the two countries. In particular, 
the use of bargaining and negotiation 
processes supported the large size, scale 
and speed of design and implementation 
of the QOF in England, and therefore 
the level of health outcomes attributable 
to the scheme. In contrast, New Zealand 
policymakers did not negotiate the 
PP directly with representatives of the 
general practice profession as part of a 
contract of service. This differentiates 
the two episodes of policy formulation 
and implementation in two similar 
jurisdictions most strikingly, and it is also 
because of this feature that the outcomes 
of each scheme differ. 
Differences in the institutional 
framework within the general practice 
subsystem in each country were found 
to be the primary driver of policy 
variation, facilitating change in England 
but frustrating it in New Zealand. In 
each country, institutional structures 
had arisen from highly path-dependent 
patterns of policymaking over successive 
decades. These structures had given rise 
over time to effective mechanisms for 
collective action and a well-developed 
working relationship with the state for 
English GPs. There were ineffective 
mechanisms for this and a poor and 
conflict-dominated relationship with the 
state in New Zealand. Chief among these 
weaker mechanisms is New Zealand’s lack 
of a mechanism for the general practice 
profession as a whole to be represented 
by a bargaining agent and therefore to 
negotiate new policy proposals directly 
with state funders. The mandate held by 
the BMA in England to be sole bargaining 
agent for general practitioners holding 
general medical services contracts 
meant that GPs had trusted delegates 
representing them in their dealings with 
the state. Their own well-organised 
professional forums enabled them to have 
a voice in discussions about the design of 
the pay-for-performance scheme. Within 
the negotiating teams, debates were 
conducted along familiar collegial, peer-
to-peer lines. A GP negotiator for the 
government side described it thus:
When I was involved in the 
negotiation it felt like a practice 
meeting ... we thought the patients 
were going to benefit ... we were 
negotiating this in order to achieve 
patient benefit. Of all the team that 
was what we were genuinely trying 
to do. 
Another described the process as 
‘discussions rather than negotiations. 
The government people were very well 
informed. It was between peers ... with 
very much a shared purpose.’ 
There was no mechanism within the 
profession in New Zealand for a process 
of coordinated debate or negotiation with 
state funders to occur in a similar way. In 
the pay-for-performance policy design 
forums, GPs’ voices were to some extent 
crowded out by those of officials and of 
other primary health care professionals, 
such as pharmacists and pathologists. GP 
participants in the policy design process 
described it thus:
This was a state-directed programme. 
I have often reflected that I don’t 
think a single thing [some partici-
There was no mechanism within the 
profession in New Zealand for a process 
of coordinated debate or negotiation with 
state funders to occur in a similar way.
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pants] said ... was reflected in the 
programme that was rolled out ... 
[such as] peer-led, based on feedback 
and performance data to individuals, 
the data referenced to colleagues and 
the group as a whole and using 
clinical meetings based on the 
evidence and outlier management 
visit ... a non-judgemental peer 
accountability process. 
The process was perceived as a threat 
to professional organisational rules and 
standards and reduced the willingness, 
collectively and individually, among New 
Zealand general practitioners to engage 
in the policymaking process. 
There was also a reduced level of 
incentive for rational choice drivers to 
influence New Zealand GPs. They did not 
depend on the state for their income to 
the same extent as in England, and could 
simply raise their fees to patients if they 
needed to. Unlike the English GPs, who 
readily agreed to permit the sharing of 
their practice data with the state in order 
to increase the size of the scheme and 
the speed of assessment and payment of 
performance incentives, the New Zealand 
GPs declined to do so. A key difference 
between the two schemes, this affected 
the size of the scheme, the type of targets 
that could be set and therefore the level of 
take-up of the new pay-for-performance 
policy. 
In both countries the offer of a 
national pay-for-performance scheme 
was a lucrative inducement to general 
practitioners to increase preventive and 
population-based health actions in their 
medical practice. But in New Zealand 
the benefits and opportunities of the 
proposed policy did not outweigh the 
perceived challenges it presented to general 
practitioners’ professional dominance 
and associated autonomy, monopoly and 
right of self-regulation (Freidson, 2001). 
In 2001, pay-for-performance health 
policymaking in national health systems 
was relatively untried. With the passage 
of time, both schemes have evolved 
and much new research about pay-for-
performance has been completed, and has 
drawn upon the experience of the QOF 
development in England. There can also 
be an assessment of whether improved 
population-based health outcomes have 
been achieved by the initiatives in both 
countries. Researchers have commented 
that the research question today is not 
whether to use pay-for-performance, but 
how best to incorporate it into financing 
arrangements for general practice services 
(Roland and Campbell, 2014).
Discussion 
New Zealand has a growing problem with 
the quality and allocation of its publicly 
funded health care. There are increasingly 
visible problems of variation in the quality 
of and access to primary health care, which 
are expected to lead to unsustainable costs 
in the long term (Health Quality and 
Safety Commission, 2015; Minister of 
Health, 2016). The steps taken in 2001–
07 to initiate an effective framework for 
population-based approaches within 
primary health care were partly successful. 
Ninety-five per cent of New Zealanders 
are now enrolled in a PHO; they hold a 
unique patient identifier, and their health 
status can be proactively monitored and 
supported to identify and prevent the 
development of chronic and costly health 
conditions. Positive progress can be seen. 
For instance, the gap between Mäori and 
non-Mäori life expectancy has narrowed 
from 8.2 years in 2000–01 to 7.3 years 
for males and from 8.8 to 6.8 years for 
females. The success of initiatives such as 
the immunisation programme for under-
two-year-olds, as mentioned above, 
part of the Performance Programme of 
incentivised health actions from 2007, has 
demonstrated the potential of this and 
a range of other population-based and 
proactive approaches (Ministry of Health, 
2013) to achieve important health gains as 
well as reduced costs over time. 
However, research conducted in 
2010 confirmed a stewardship deficit in 
primary health care policymaking in New 
Zealand and Australia, where ‘a powerful 
profession appears to have succeeded in 
securing significant autonomy and self-
determination while receiving public 
funding in return for relatively little 
specification or monitoring as to how 
that funding is used’, by comparison with 
England (Smith et al, 2010, p.101). Many 
building blocks of effective population-
based health care are once again at risk, 
including cost of access, quality and 
availability of best practice preventive 
care, and adequate numbers of general 
practitioners to meet population health 
needs. The challenge of equalising 
problems of access remains, with 14% 
of New Zealanders reporting that they 
are unable to visit a GP because of cost; 
this figure is worse for Mäori (22%) 
and Pacific peoples (21%) (Minister of 
Health, 2016, p.20). The projected cost 
of providing health services through the 
current model is reported by the minister 
of health to be unsustainable (ibid., 
p.11). For instance, preventive treatment 
approaches to diabetes, which accounted 
for 14% of hospital bed days in 2013 
(Health Quality and Safety Commission, 
2015, p.48), are poorly delivered, with only 
about half of people over 25 years of age 
with diabetes recorded as being treated 
for good glycaemic control, including 
through the prescription of metformin or 
insulin. The rate of undiagnosed diabetes 
in England is reported as approximately 
27%.1 Unexplained levels of variation in 
treatment patterns in this country show, 
according to the Health Quality and 
Safety Commission New Zealand, that 
improvements remain possible. General 
practice services, which are an essential 
foundation of population-based health 
care, are themselves under significant 
pressure. The Royal New Zealand College 
... New Zealand policymakers continue 
to exhibit weak stewardship over the 
primary health care system, ... between 
the general practice profession, ... and 
the state, ...
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of General Practitioners reports a low 
and falling ratio of GPs to population in 
a predicted environment of increasing 
need (Royal New Zealand College of 
General Practitioners, 2015, pp.4-5). 
It is argued here that New Zealand 
policymakers continue to exhibit weak 
stewardship over the primary health 
care system, and in particular have been 
unable to develop the necessary quality of 
partnership between the general practice 
profession, which holds responsibility for 
training, certification and practice, and the 
state, which provides the overwhelming 
majority of funding for general practice 
professional development and service 
delivery. Where existing institutional 
arrangements fail to resolve abiding 
challenges of access and quality within 
a publicly funded primary health care 
system, there is a strong case for reform 
of general practice/state institutional 
relationships, and for enhancement of 
institutional forms within the general 
practice profession itself, to achieve the 
necessary progress. 
Looking forward 
As a final contribution from this 
research, some next steps are proposed 
for consideration by policymakers in 
New Zealand which might improve their 
ability to achieve population-based health 
outcomes through primary health care 
services.
First, there is opportunity for a 
stronger collaboration between New 
Zealand and England. Despite the different 
results and the differences between the 
general practice subsystems in the two 
countries (which have grown in recent 
years, with the decision to implement 
general practice-based commissioning in 
England), there remain many similarities 
in the institutional, structural and 
cultural features of the two overarching 
health systems. There are well-developed 
linkages between England and New 
Zealand for policymaking dialogue in 
both the political and the policy streams. 
The United Kingdom’s health system is 
currently ranked as much more effective 
than New Zealand’s in a regular health 
systems monitoring report issued by 
the Commonwealth Fund, ranking first 
of eleven health systems for safe and 
patient-centred care which is accessible 
on cost grounds (Davis et al., 2014). 
However, the two primary health 
care systems exhibit significant 
differences relating to the ownership and 
management arrangements for general 
practice, the relationships between the 
general practice profession and the 
state, and the structure of the general 
practice profession. In the period since 
2000–01 England has improved its 
health system performance overall. For 
instance, in developments since 2004, 
English policymakers have made step-
by-step improvements to their pay-for-
performance scheme, including removing 
the design of the QOF from the collective 
bargaining environment. It has recently 
been decided to reduce the component 
of income which is dependent upon 
it within the general medical services 
contract. GPs have undertaken more 
extensive roles in the commissioning and 
management of a continuum of medical 
services in their locality. New Zealand, 
by contrast, has stalled its development 
of pay-for-performance frameworks, 
despite their early signs of promising 
achievements and international evidence 
that these form a desirable component of 
physician remuneration schemes. A strong 
case exists for New Zealand policymakers 
to seek to emulate the ownership and 
financing arrangements which exist in 
England in order to achieve similar levels 
of influence over the primary health care 
system. While this would undoubtedly be 
a radical and costly reform, examination 
of the evidence base and the cost–benefit 
case, based on projected levels of forward 
liability for health care costs, could be 
undertaken as part of a process of active 
consideration of a more assertive model 
of state stewardship of primary health 
care services. 
A key variable to consider in 
approaching such a radical policy reform 
is the appropriate scale and pace of 
change to resolve New Zealand’s primary 
health care stewardship deficit. New 
Zealand policymakers could support the 
evolution of both the current general 
practice institutional forms and interest 
group structures towards different 
types of political exchange over time, 
with incentives for the development of 
greater trust and collaboration within 
this subsystem. This would entail, for 
instance, developing a more consensual 
and receptive institutional context for the 
introduction of improved accountability 
frameworks. Steps to take to provide for 
the development of such a framework 
might include:
•	 Mandating	a	single	national	
representative body for general 
practice, perhaps consisting of a 
forum of representatives from the 
various segments of the general 
practice professional community. 
Such a body would have unrestricted 
access to government decision-
makers regarding policymaking 
which affected general practice, 
utilising principle-based bargaining 
and negotiation processes. This 
could be expected to lead to the slow 
building of greater mutual trust, 
between general practitioners and 
the representative body and between 
that body and the state, through 
repeated examples of consensus-
based policymaking that was seen to 
balance the interests of both parties.
•	 Supporting	the	development	of	a	
stronger policy community within 
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primary health care (including 
general practice) to inform policy 
ideas and develop information and 
knowledge infrastructure based 
on evidence. This could include 
investment of adequate resources 
to build a comprehensive shared 
database for primary care service 
delivery on the model of the QMAS 
(Quality Management Analysis 
System, developed by the NHS), and 
rapid development of an evidence 
base, shared national service 
frameworks and quality standards 
and targets on the model of the 
domains developed within the QOF.
•	 Negotiating	greater	alignment	
between both interest groups and 
policy specialists and the two 
major political parties on key 
aspects of population-based health 
policy. A bipartisan agreement to 
support the key elements of agreed 
infrastructure-building over a ten-
year period, avoiding the regular 
cycle of policy windows at election 
time, which can bring policy 
reversals, could be a first step towards 
achieving longer periods of time for 
policy changes to embed.
Predicted changes within the general 
practice workforce over the next ten 
years provide an opportunity to negotiate 
new terms and conditions of work, new 
financing and ownership arrangements 
for state-funded general practice services, 
and new working relationships between 
the profession and the state. Forty-one 
per cent of current general practitioners 
plan to retire by 2025. Younger GPs 
are predominantly female, and these 
younger, female GPs are more likely to 
work part-time and as employees; it 
is unclear whether they will continue 
working part-time in future years or 
look to increase their hours either as 
employees or practice owners (Royal New 
Zealand College of General Practitioners, 
2015). While revolutionary, top-down, 
non-consensual policymaking, such as 
has characterised previous episodes of 
health system reform in New Zealand, 
is in theory also an option, this would 
reinforce rather than remedy the fractious 
relationships which currently exist 
between the general practice profession 
and the state. These relationships can only 
be repaired and better government within 
the health system advanced by building 
an environment in which courageous 
decision-making, skilful relationship-
building and collaborative, evidence-
based policymaking can be undertaken 
by both the profession and the state.
1 https://www.nice.org.uk/guidance/ph38/chapter/2-Public-
health-need-and-practice.
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CONFERENCE
Advancing Better Government 
Through Legislative Stewardship
How do we design legislative and 
regulatory systems so that we can protect 
the interests of the future, including 
those of our ‘future selves’ and future 
generations?
Stewardship – active planning and 
management of regulation and legislation 
advice – is a statutory obligation for chief 
executives and, through them, the New 
Zealand public service. This conference 
will bring together leading drafters, officials 
and academics to address “legislative 
stewardship” – not only what it is, but most 
importantly how we can all do it.
Confirmed presenters include Brenda 
King, First Legislative Counsel for Northern 
Ireland; Richard Wallace, Parliamentary 
Counsel Office, Prof Paul Rishworth QC, 
Crown Law Office; Miriam Dean QC, 
barrister; Prof Mark Hickford, Prof Geoff 
McLay, AProf Michael Macaulay, Victoria 
University of Wellington.
When:  27 October (full day) 
and 28 October 2016 
(morning)
Where:  Wellington,  
New Zealand
For more details visit  
www.victoria.ac.nz/ 
legislative-stewardship
